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SEARCH WARRANT REQUIRED TO SEARCH THIRD PARTY HOME FOR
SUBJECT OF ARREST WARRANT
Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981)
In Steagald v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court re-
solved a sharply disputed2 fourth amendment3 question by holding
that, absent exigent circumstances4 or consent,5 police officers must ob-
1. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
2. See notes 27-60 infra and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Warrantless Entry
to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 ILL. L.F. 655.
3. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. One explanation of "exigent circumstances" is stated in Comment, Arresting A Suspect in
A Third Pary's Home; Wiat Is Reasonable?, 72 J. CRiM. L. & C. 293 (1981):
In deciding whether the situation is an exigent one, the officer would consider the factors
suggested in Dorman v. United States: seriousness of the offense, reasonable belief that
the suspect is armed, probable cause and reasonably trustworthy information that the
suspect committed a crime, likelihood of escape, and peaceful nature of the entry. Addi-
tional considerations for the officer would be those enumerated in Wallace v. King: hot
pursuit, fear of injury to others if the arrest is delayed, availability of a magistrate, and
ability of police to keep watch while a search warrant is obtained. Conversely, a passage
of time between the officer's belief that the suspect is within and the actual entry would
militate against a finding of exigent circumstances. Similarly, a prior formalized strategy
to execute entry by police would be a factor indicating that a search warrant should have
been sought.
Id at 313. Accord, Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1980); Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Latzer, Enforcement Workshop: Police Entries
to Arrest, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 156, 163 (1981) ("the essence of an exigency is the existence of
circumstances known to the police which prevent them from taking the time to obtain a warrant
because to do so would thwart or make more dangerous the arrest"). See generally C. WHITE-
BREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 157-
65 (1980); Comment, supra note 2, at 676-87.
5. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (when person is not under arrest or
in custody, police do not have affirmative duty to inform person of right to refuse consent to a
search; in order to prove valid consent state need only show it was given voluntarily). See also
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (reaffirming Schneckloth); Bumper v. North Caro-
lina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (prosecutor must prove consent was freely given); United States v. Jones,
641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981) (valid consent search must be based on more than the "mere expres-
sion of approval to the search"); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 240.2(2)-
(3) (1975) (person must be notified that he is not required to give consent and any evidence uncov-
ered in the search will be used at trial; furthermore, if the person is under arrest or in police
custody, he must be informed of his right to counsel before giving consent to the search). For a
detailed study of searches pursuant to consent, see C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 197-211.
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tain a search warrant prior to searching the home of a third party for
the subject of an arrest warrant.
Drug Enforcement Administration Agents received information
leading them to believe that a fugitive, Lyons, was staying at the Stea-
gald residence. The agents, acting only under the authority of an arrest
warrant for Lyons, entered and searched the Steagald house. The dis-
covery of drugs during this search resulted in criminal charges against
Steagald.6 Prior to trial, Steagald moved to suppress the drugs, claim-
ing that the fourth amendment prohibited the agents from entering his
home on the authority of the Lyons arrest warrant.
The district court found that the arrest warrant was sufficient to jus-
tify the search and denied the motion to suppress the evidence.' Stea-
gald was convicted. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,9 reversed, and held:
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution requires a law enforcement officer to obtain
a search warrant prior to searching the home of a third party for the
subject of an arrest warrant. 10
The fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion into the privacy of their homes." The amendment
6. Steagald was convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976).
7. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979).
8. Id
9. Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1644 (1981).
10. Id
11. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[a]bsent exigent circumstances,
that threshold [entrance to the house] may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant"); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) ("[tjhe security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society") (quoting
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (case
restating assertion in Wo!f concerning a conversation recorded by an electronic device); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) ("except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,
a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("[alt the very
core [of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498
(1958) ("the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwar-
ranted intrusions into his privacy"); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 44-45 (1966) ("the amendment was designed to protect against arbitrary arrests as well as
searches is evident from the history of the abuses which gave rise to the amendment"); Amster-
[Vol. 59:1409
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was developed by the constitutional founders as a response 12 to the
English writs of assistance. 13  As such, the fourth amendment safe-
guards the sanctity of the home14 from arbitrary invasion by requiring
dam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 363 (1974) ("[i]ndisputably,
forcible entries by officers into a person's home or office are the aboriginal subject of the fourth
amendment and the prototype of the 'searches' and 'seizures' that it covers"); 23 STAN. L. REV.
995, 997 (1971) ("[tlhe right to be secure in the privacy of one's home against arbitrary govern-
mental intrusions is the heart of the fourth amendment").
12. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("it is familiar history that indiscrimi-
nate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of'general warrants' were the immediate
evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment"). For commentaries
that support this proposition, see Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 46-53 (1960); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV.
L. REV. 361, 362 (1921); Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: The Seizure 0/a Suspect
in the Home ofa Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299, 302 (1980). See also Comment, Watson and
Ramey: The Balance ofInterests in Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 838
(1976), in which the author states: "The fourth amendment was adopted precisely in reaction to
the general warrant. The framers drafted the amendment to neutralize the arbitrary power of the
government to search and arrest at will." Id. at 846 (footnotes omitted).
For an in depth discussion of the history of the fourth amendment and the influence of English
law on the writers of the Constitution, see J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 11, at 19-48. See also 3
ELIuoTT's DEBATES 448, 449, 588 (1854) (debates over language of Bill of Rights).
13. Writs of assistance were general warrants that described the object, but not the place, of
the search. See generally R. MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 100-03 (1959). The
Supreme Court explains the founders' hostility to the general writ in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886):
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants
known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the
colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to
search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws. They were
denounced by James Otis as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destruc-
tive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an
English law book," because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer."
Id at 625. Boyd has been reiterated in numerous cases. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 583-84 n.21 (1980). See also Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 411:
[Tihe objectionable feature of general warrants and writs must be their indiscriminate
character. Warrants are not to issue indiscriminately: that is the office of the probable
cause requirement. Nor may indiscriminate searches be made under them: that is why
particularity of description of the persons or things to be seized is demanded... . [Tihe
framers decreed that it was unreasonable and should be unconstitutional to subject his
premises or possessions to indiscriminate seizure.
See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100-03 (1937).
14. The value that underlies the fourth amendment was derived from the English adage that
every man's home is his castle. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (KB. 1603) ("that the
house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his respose"). See also Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1650 (1981);
Washington University Open Scholarship
1412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1409
that judicial scrutiny precede the search and seizure process.15
The Supreme Court historically has required a search warrant 6 ex-
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1980); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-62
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
Another English case that emphasized the sanctity of the home and influenced American case
law was Entick v. Carrington, 93 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), which is discussed in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886):
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security. . . . IT]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employe's of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking
of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property ....
Id at 630. See Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 381 (referring to Entick as "something of a lexicon
of the 'original understanding' of the Fourth Amendment"). See also Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301 (1958), which quotes a remark made in Parliament by William Pitt in 1763:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may
be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter, but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement!
Id at 307.
15. The Court articulates this point in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971):
[Tihe magistrate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on
probable cause. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is
an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of
necessity . . . . The second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary
should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the 'general warrant' abhorred
by the colonists, and the problem is not that ofintrusionperse, but of a general, explora-
tory rummaging in a person's belongings.
Id at 467. See also Note, Arrests on Third Party Premises: Reasonableness Under the Fourth
Amendment, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 449 (1981):
The warrant requirement serves two constitutional objectives: ensuring the existence of
a credible justification of police intrusion by interposing a neutral magistrate between
police and public, and limiting the scope of the intrusion by circumscribing police discre-
tion. Because the abuses potentially present during arrest on third party premises closely
parallel the evils sought to be avoided by the warrant requirement, the safeguard pro-
vided by the warrant requirement, including prior judicial review, are particularly ap-
propriate to such arrests.
Id at 457 (footnotes omitted). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 422-39.
16. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (warrantless taking of letters from
defendant's house by U.S. Marshal held unconstitutional); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) (law requiring defendant accused of smuggling goods into United States without paying
duties to produce business records or papers requested by prosecutor held unconstitutional). In
Weeks, the Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value. . . . The efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of en-
deavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land. The United States Marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused
when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution. . . . In Adams v.
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cept in a few limited situations,17 to justify the search of any home.
New York, 192 U.S. 585, this court said that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his
home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection
is equally extended to the action of the Government and officers of the law acting under
it.... To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the
protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
Id at 393-94. In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Court explained:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully ar-
rested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order
to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is
not to be doubted .... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's
house was several blocks distant from Alba'a house, where the arrest was made....
That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests.
... [I]t has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched with-
out a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein. . . . The search of
a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.
Id at 30-32. See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (when defendant is arrested in front of
his residence, police are not justified in searching his home without a search warrant); Shipley v.
California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) (same); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (Court rejected
search as incident to an arrest with arrest warrant when search was without consent; search for
possible weapons or destructible evidence may only be of the person and the immediate area in
his control); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (search incident to arrest valid only if it is
substantially contemporaneous with arrest and confined to immediate vicinity of arrest).
The Court has limited the protection of the home by characterizing the fourth amendment as a
personal right that may be asserted only by the victim of the illegal search. See, e.g., Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (personal rights of fourth amendment may not be vicari-
ously asserted--exclusion of evidence against one defendant to protect rights of another not neces-
sary); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390-94 (1968) (to assert fourth amendment right
defendant must acknowledge personal ownership of the premises searched or property seized-
such an acknowledgement may not be used against defendant at trial); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963) (defendant has no personal right of privacy in the premises
searched).
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (mere passengers in a car did not have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the areas searched; thus no violation of their fourth amendment
rights); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (FBI tape recordings of defendant's conversa-
tions on a public telephone did not violate fourth amendment rights); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960) (guest staying in an apartment for a few days allowed to challenge a search of the
apartment during his stay).
See generally Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing
Cases, 65 IowA L. REv. 493 (1980).
17. See, eg., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,509 (1978) (police may search without a search
warrant "when there is a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant");
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (Court permitted warrantless search of defendant's
home when police suspected defendant had just committed a robbery). For an in depth review of
the exigent circumstances exception, see 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 384-85 (1978).
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Thus the Court ensured that a neutral and detached magistrate" would
balance the need for the search against the invasion of the sanctity of
an individual's home. 9 However, the Court compromised the uni-
18. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Johnson, the police smelled burning
opium outside a hotel room. Without an arrest warrant or search warrant, they entered and ar-
rested the occupant. A search of the room uncovered a quantity of opium. The Court refused to
sanction the search and stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in a reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government en-
forcement agent.
Id at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). Accord, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). In
McDonald, police broke into defendant's rented room without an arrest warrant or search war-
rant, acting on the belief that defendant was operating an illegal lottery. The Court refused to
admit the fruits of the search into evidence. The Court reasoned:
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.
This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that consti-
tutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by
those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.
Id at 455-56. For a discussion of McDonald, see Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless
Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82 DIcK. L. REv. 167, 170 (1977).
The attitude of the Court in warrantless administrative searches is different and dependent on
the consequences of refusal. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (warrantless search by
welfare caseworkers upheld when refusal to permit the search results in termination of benefits
and not criminal sanctions); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless search
pursuant to the housing code held unreasonable when the penalty for refusing to allow the search
was criminal prosecution).
19. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (statute al-
lowing warrantless searches when national security affected did not grant authority for warrantless
searches in domestic security surveillance; fourth amendment protection and the overriding indi-
vidual privacy interests mandated prior judicial approval of searches). See generally Rotenberg &
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formity of its search warrant requirement in Payton v. New York.2° In
Payton, the Court recognized the importance of search warrants, 2' but
nevertheless held that an arrest warrant, alone, is sufficient justification
for police to enter the suspect's home.22 The Court reasoned that the
magistrate, in evaluating the probable cause to arrest and deciding to
issue the arrest warrant, implicitly considered entry by the police into
the suspect's home to execute the warrant.23
In Payton, the Court recognized the potential for violation of third
parties' fourth amendment rights when, without a search warrant, po-
lice search third party homes for the subject of an arrest warrant.24 Be-
cause the Payton decision is limited to the arrest of a suspect in his own
home,25 the opinion cannot be adapted to the issue of warrantless en-
Tanzer, Searchingfor the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L.L 56 (1974); 23 STAN. L. REV. 995
(1971).
20. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). For an in depth discussion of Payton, see Latzer, supra note 4, at
159-60 (Payton decision is a "step in the right direction" but it has shortcomings); 4 AM. J. TRIAL
ADV. 447, 449 (1980) (commentator in agreement with the Payton decision); 14 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 907, 914 (1981) (Payton result was consistent with the fourth amendment, but the amend-
ment requires "a stronger and more coherent method of reasoning"); 58 DEN. L.J. 197, 209 (1980)
(Payton deviates from accepted common law practice but is "long overdue ruling"); 94 HARV. L.
REV. 178, 186 (1980) (Payton result "laudable but insufficient"); 10 STETSON L. REv. 343, 362-63
(1981) (Payton a "clear and simple rule" that is "easy to follow and should not admit of diverse
interpretations"); 49 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 232, 244 (1981) (Payton decision very narrow and does not
finally resolve the issue of warrantless arrest entries).
21. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
22. Id at 603. The Court explained the significance of the home:
[A]ny differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely
ones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental characteris-
tic: the breach of the entrance to an individual's home. The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an indi-
vidual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The
right of the people to be secure in their.., houses. . . shall not be violated."
Id at 589.
23. The Court states:
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search
warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of
probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence
of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is
justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers
of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on proba-
ble cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.
445 U.S. at 602-03.
24. Id at 583.
25. Id One commentator writing on this part of the Payton decision states:
[Tihe Court for the first time has placed the privacy interests of an arrestee in his home
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tries into third party residences. In addition, the magistrate's determi-
nation of probable cause to arrest did not consider the propriety of an
invasion of the fourth amendment rights of third parties.26
Payton thus raised, but did not decide, the question as to the legiti-
macy of entering a third person's home to execute a valid arrest war-
rant. With no guidance from the Supreme Court, the federal circuits
divided into three positions:27 one, that entry is justified by the arrest
warrant alone;2" two, that entry is justified by the arrest warrant plus a
reasonable belief that the suspect is in the third party's dwelling;29 and
three, that absent exigent circumstances or consent, entry cannot be jus-
tified without a valid search warrant. 30
In United States v. Harper,3 the Tenth Circuit adopted the position
that an arrest warrant, alone, justified the search of a third party's
on an equal constitutional footing with those of a victim of a search, and, in so doing, has
expanded the zone of privacy protected by the fourth amendment. And, finally, it recog-
nizes arrest as a species of seizure under the amendment, and reaffirms its commitment
to the precept that the amendment, above all else, protects people.
Mascolo, supra note 12, at 302.
26. A critique of the Payton decision comments:
In addition to these differences in judicial determination, the two warrants cannot be
treated as interchangeable as search warrant determinations are not made when an arrest
warrant issues. In the context of any entry into the suspect's home, the Payton Court
argued that the magistrate implicitly considers the privacy rights of the suspect when
issuing an arrest warrant by logically assuming that the officers will go to the arrestee's
home first to make the arrest. Regardless of whether this principle could withstand scru-
tiny in the suspect home entry situation, it certainly would not apply to the third party
home entry. Under current warrant practices, the magistrate makes no determination
that the suspect might be at a friend's or relative's home. Even if the magistrate implic-
itly considers that an arrest warrant could be executed in any home, that consideration
does not have the same kind of particularlity as an implicit determination that a suspect
will be arrested in his own home. The latter determination is limited to the residence of
a named person, while the former is a limitless inclusion of every residence without any
determination as to a particular person's residence. Therefore, in contrast to the arrestee
home entry situation, the third party's right to be free from unreasonable searches is not
considered implicitly or otherwise when the magistrate issues the arrest warrant for the
suspect.
Comment, supra note 4, at 300 (footnotes omitted).
27. Only two circuits had not ruled on the issue prior to Steagald See United States v.
Gillespie, 650 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (court postponed decision until after Supreme Court
handed down Steagald and then acted in harmony); United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (st
Cir. 1980) (police entered and searched third party's residence without arrest or search warrant;
court suppressed evidence due to the lack of exigent circumstances and refused to decide whether
an arrest or search warrant was necessary).
28. See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 34-49 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 50-60 infra and accompanying text.
31. 550 F.2d 610 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
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home for an arrest warrant suspect. The court asserted that the entry
into a third party's dwelling was a "lawful utilization"32 of an arrest
warrant.33
Five circuits, 4 in varying degrees, found sufficient justification for
entry into a third party home when the officer had an arrest warrant
and reasonably believed the subject of the warrant to be in the dwell-
ing. The Fifth Circuit, in United States P. Cravero,36 and the District
32. Id at 613.
33. Id The Tenth Circuit held that the lower court "properly determined the agents' initial
entry to be a lawful utilization of the arrest warrant for Black, and that the evidence seized at that
time, and thereafter pursuant to the search warrant, was properly seized and admissible in evi-
dence." Id
The court found additional support for its position in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which specify the territorial boundaries of an arrest warrant as "anyplace within the jurisdiction
of the United States." FED. R. CraM. P. 4(d)(2) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit concluded:
"The [arrest] warrant has efficacy throughout the United States and constitutes authority for ar-
resting the defendant whereverfound" 550 F.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
34. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have accepted this
position. See notes 35-50 infra and accompanying text.
35. See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6(1) (1975):
Section 120.6 Place ofArrest: Private Premises
(1) Demand to Enter and Entry into Private Premises to Make an Arrest. If a law
enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom he is authorized
to arrest is present on any private premises, he may, upon identifying himself as such an
officer, demand that he be admitted to such premises for the purpose of making the
arrest. If such demand is not promptly complied with, the officer may thereupon enter
such premises to make the arrest, using such force as is reasonably necessary.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
§ 204 Entry to Arrestfor Criminal Offense
The privilege to make an arrest for a criminal offense carries with it the privilege to
enter land in the possession of another for the purpose of making such an arrest, if the
person sought to be arrested is on the land or if the actor reasonably believes him to be
there.
206 Forcible Entry of Dwelling to Arrest, Recapture, Prevent Crimes, and Related
Sitatuations
(2) Although the person sought is not in the dwelling, the actor is privileged to use
force ... if he reasonably believes him to be there, and enters in the exercise of a
privilege
(a) to make a criminal arrest under a warrant valid or fair on its
face.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 204, 206 (1965).
36. 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). In Vasquez v.
Snow, 616 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1980), the court adhered to Cravero but found that the officer's belief
was not "reasonable":
[A]n arrest warrant permits pursuit into the premises of a third party if and only if the
investigating officers' knowledge and trustworthy information would cause a man of rea-
sonable caution to believe that the suspect 'is in [that]particular building.'. . . It follows
conversely that an arrest warrant alone cannot sanction pursuit into a private residence
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of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Brown,37 explicitly adopted
this position. The court in Cravero38 reasoned that the arrest warrant,
which is the product of a magistrate's finding of probable cause, has
"particularized" the search39 and therefore obviated the need for a
search warrant.
The Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, in dicta, accepted the war-
rant plus reasonable belief standard. In United States v. McKinney,4"
the Sixth Circuit explained that the issuance of an arrest warrant, to-
gether with the inherent mobility of a fugitive, might constitute an ex-
ceptional circumstance and therefore eliminate the need4' for a search
where, as here, there exists a substantial likelihood that the suspect is at a location other
than the target.
Id at 219-20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
See United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.) (court upheld police entrance and search of
a building pursuant to an arrest warrant and asserted that a search warrant is not necessary), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.)(court upheld search of
third party home without a search warrant to execute an arrest warrant for a known, dangerous,
and armed fugitive), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973). Cf. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th
Cir. 1980) (civil suit for damages to petitioners' fourth amendment rights when police searched
their home without a search warrant; court applied Cravero standard of arrest warrant plus rea-
sonable belief).
37. 457 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Brown decision was based on the standard of review
announced in Palmer v. United States, 192 A.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In Palmer, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals declared: "An officer with a warrant outstanding for the arrest of an
individual named therein may enter upon private premises if he has reasonable cause to believe
that such party can be found there." Id at 803. Additionally, in Brown, the District of Columbia
Circuit found support for its position in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and cited to rule
4(b)(1) (currently at Rule 4(d)(2)). 457 F.2d at 423-24. See note 33 supra. But see United States
v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court distinguished Brown in holding that police
must obtain search warrants prior to invading a house to install or remove electronic bugging
devices).
38. Cravero, the defendant, for whom the police had an arrest warrant, was in the home of
the third party at the time of the search. The police entered the house with the arrest warrant and
with a reasonable belief that Cravero was inside. United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 412-13
(5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
39. Id at 421 n.l. The court reasoned:
One explanation for not requiring a search warrant to enter a third person's home to
execute an arrest is that there is no need to particularize the search--the arrest warrant
has already done that. There is not the same danger of the 'general writ' which is the
reason for requiring that a search warrant describe what specific items police are allowed
to search for.
Id
Additionally, Cravero served as the precedent for the lower court decisions in Steagald See
notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
40. 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967). For a discussion of McKinney, see Rotenberg & Tanzer,
supra note 19, at 68.
41. Id at 263. The Sixth Circuit stated-
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warrant. More recently, in United States v. Jones,42 the Sixth Circuit
questioned its Cravero position and asserted that the arrest warrant
plus reasonable belief standard constituted only the "constitutional
minimum."'43 The Eighth Circuit paralleled the Jones rationale in Rice
v. Wolff.4 Although the court in Rice declared that the fourth amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
people as well as property,45 it reluctantly denied the need for a search
warrant and accepted the arrest warrant plus reasonable belief stan-
dard as the constitutional minimum.46
[A] search warrant is not necessary to execute an arrest warrant in such circumstances.
We agree with the observation that the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment that people
shall be secure in their homes from unreasonable searches applies whether the govern-
ment is searching for objects or for a person for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
But even if we were to accept appellant's premise that a search warrant must be obtained
in the absence of exceptional circumstances, there is good reason to hold that the issu-
ance of an arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need for a
search warrant. An arrest warrant is validly issued only when a magistrate is convinced
that there is probable cause to believe that the named party has committed an offense.
This determination, together with the inherent mobility of the suspect, would justify a
search for the suspect provided the authorities reasonably believe he could be found on
the premises searched.
Id (footnote omitted). But f Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (all "routine" felony
arrests in the suspects' homes must be with an arrest warrant); Latzer, supra note 4, at 164
("[c]learly, the mere issuance of an arrest warrant does not convert a routine arrest into an exigent
circumstance").
42. 641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981). In Jones, the court rejected the complaint by the subject of
the arrest warrant that the search of the third party's house was illegal due to the absence of a
search warrant.
43. The Sixth Circuit explained:
We begin with the obvious-an arrest warrant is not a search warrant. By itself, an
arrest warrant signifies no more than there is a reason to believe the person named in the
warrant has committed a crime. It is, however, fundamental that government officials
cannot invade the privacy of one's home without probable cause for the entry. As a
constitutional minimum therefore, an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling
only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to be-
lieve the person named in the warrant is within.
Id at 428 (footnote omitted).
44. 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds sub nort' Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976).
45. Id at 1291. The Eighth Circuit declared:
Police entry into a private dwelling without a search warrant in search of a suspect for
whom an arrest warrant has been issued carried precisely the same fourth amendment
implications as entry into a dwelling to make a warrantless search for tangible property.
Citizens are entitled to the same constitutional protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures when the police are seeking a suspect for arrest as when they are seeking
some contraband for evidence.
Id
46. Id at 1292. For a discussion ofARce, see Comment, supra note 4, at 309-10.
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The Second Circuit, in United States v. Arboleda,47 rationalized its
adoption of the arrest warrant plus reasonable belief standard by mini-
mizing the differences between arrest and search warrants. The court
suggested that an arrest warrant would have the "same legal effect" as a
search warrant in authorizing the search of a third party's residence.
48
United States v. Manley49 reaffirmed the Second Circuit's commitment
to this standard.
Three Circuits adopted the position that police officers must obtain
search warrants prior to executing arrest warrants in third parties'
47. 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980) (police went to defendant's house to arrest his brother with-
out an arrest or search warrant; police found drugs and defendant was convicted), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 917 (1981).
48. Id at 989. The court stated:
Although there was no search warrant for Arboleda's apartment, the police officers were
going to the apartment to arrest Gilberto (defendant's brother), and if they had an arrest
warrant for Gilberto this would have the same legal effect as a search warrant in justify-
ing entry into Arboleda's home to effect the arrest.
Id Some suggest that in effect, the Second Circuit required only an arrest warrant to enter a third
party's home. In a spirited dissent from Arboleda, Circuit Judge Oakes advocated the position
taken by the Third Circuit. Judge Oakes stated:
While the probable cause requirement for entries based solely on arrest warrants affords
some protection against police discretion, there remains a danger that relatively indis-
criminate entries will be justified subsequently by elaborate explanations concerning
probable cause. It would be safer to adopt a standard for arrests in the homes of third
parties that is analogous to seizures of property: absent exigent circumstances, a warrant
must specify the location to be entered in advance.
Id at 995. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit position, see notes 51-60 infra and
accompanying text.
See also Comment, supra note 4, at 297-98 n.27 (rboleda decision "provides the best example
of minimization of the difference between the two warrants"). But ef. United States v. Reed, 572
F.2d 412 (2d Cir.) (police arrest suspect in his home without an arrest or search warrant), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978). In Reed, the Second Circuit stated: "To be arrested in the home
involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the
home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant." Id at 423. One
commentator interpreted Reed to require a search warrant. See Comment, supra note 4, at 310
n.92.
49. 632 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). The court stated: "The
law in this Circuit now holds that police may enter a dwelling to execute an arrest warrant for a
person other than its owner or tenant where there exists 'reasonable belief' that the party sought
will be found therein." Id at 983. Accord, United States v. Hammond, 585 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1978). In Hammond, the police entered defendant's house with an arrest warrant for Hansen.
They searched the house and found incriminating evidence against defendant. At trial the de-
fendant's attorney failed to question the police's authority to enter defendant's home, but the court
asserted that "an arrest warrant may be all that is required for law enforcement officers to enter a
private residence, or to search that residence, for purposes of arresting the subject of the warrant."
Id at 28 n.1.
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homes." In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau lI the Third Cir-
cuit stated unequivocally that an arrest warrant is not a substitute for a
search warrant.52 According to this reasoning an officer may invade
the home of a third party under the authority of an arrest warrant only
when he has probable cause to believe the suspect is within the dwel-
ling and exigent circumstances exist.5 3 The Fourth Circuit, in Lankford
v. Gelston,54 had recognized in dictum the necessity of a search warrant
to protect the interests of the third party.55 The court subsequently rati-
fied this position in Wallace v. King56 by holding that a police officer, in
non-exigent circumstances, must obtain a search warrant.
The decision in United States v. Prescott58 addressed the issue in a
different manner. The Ninth Circuit discarded the labels "arrest" and
"search" warrant59 and instead required a warrant, regardless of its ti-
tle, to specify the "place to be searched" and the "persons or things to
50. See notes 51-60 infra and accompanying text.
51. 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). For a discussion of Gereau,
see 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 120, 129-30 (1981).
52. 502 F.2d at 928. 4ccord, Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974) (civil suit for
damages brought against the police officers who entered and searched plaintiffs apartment for a
third party named in an arrest warrant).
53. Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909
(1975). Cf. United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979) (warrantless entry into third
party dwelling by police is upheld because of exigent circumstances), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934
(1980).
54. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
55. Id at 205-06. The court stated:
[Firom the standpoint of the victim the invasion of the privacy of his home is unaffected
by the object of the policeman's search. The gravity of the invasion is precisely the same
whether the policeman's objective is to search for a person or for an inanimate object,
and the resulting injury is not mitigated by the fact that the officer may have a warrant to
arrest some person but has not bothered to obtain a warrant from a judicial officer to
search specified premises-not the premises of the person in the arrest warrant. The
contention is that the determination of probable cause for searching a particular home
for a suspect who does not live there is the function of the magistrate, not the policeman.
Id
56. 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2045 (1981).
57. Id at 1161. But see United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1978) (court upheld
search of residence known to be the headquarters of a narcotics distribution ring with only arrest
warrant and reasonable belief that suspect was inside), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979), cited with
approvalin Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1162 (4th Cir. 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 2045 (1981).
For a discussion of Wallace, see Groot,.drrests in Private Dwellings, 67 VA. L. Rv. 275 (1981);
Note, supra note 15, at 466-67; Comment, supra note 4, at 308 n.77, 311. See also 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 120 (1981); 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 610 (1981).
58. 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
59. Id at 1350.
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be seized."60  This, in effect, required the equivalent of a search
warrant.
In Steagald v. United States,6 Justice Marshall, writing for the ma-
jority, proclaimed that police officers must obtain a search warrant, ab-
sent consent or exigent circumstances, in order to search a third party's
residence for the subject of an arrest warrant.62 Although recognizing
that the purpose of both search and arrest warrants, in general, is to
interject impartial judicial scrutiny into the probable cause determina-
tion, the Court distinguished between the interests protected by the
search and arrest warrants.63 Thus, the Court noted that a magistrate's
finding of probable cause for an arrest warrant fails to consider third
parties' rights.' 4 Because an unjustified intrusion into the privacy of an
innocent person's home is a serious encroachment on his rights, the
Court held that the decision to enter a third party's home, in non-exi-
gent circumstances, must not be left to the police officer's unfettered
discretion.65 By imposing a search warrant requirement, the Court be-
lieved that it was effectuating the framers' intentions by protecting the
rights of third parties from arbitrary intrusion.66
In dismissing the government's contention that a search warrant re-
quirement would create significant problems for the law enforcement
community, the Court noted that a suspect may be apprehended with-
out a search warrant when he is in public or in his own residence.67
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the exigent circumstances ex-
60. Id The court reasoned: "[Tihe distinction between a search warrant and an arrest war-
rant is an artificial one. The Fourth Amendment makes no such distinction. ... The warrant,
whatever it be called, must describe 'the place to be searche'... and 'the persons or things to be
seized." Id
See also United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974) (earlier dicta that support the
Prescott decision). For a discussion of Prescott, see Note, supra note 15, at 467.
61. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
62. Id at 1649. Initially, the Court refused to consider the government's contention that
petitioner lacked a sufficient expectation of privacy. The Court reasoned that the government not
only failed to raise the issue in the lower courts, but articulated statements directly to the contrary.
Id at 1646-47.
63. The Court concluded that an arrest warrant protects an "individual from an unreasona-
ble seizure" whereas a search warrant protects an individual's "interest in the privacy of his home
and possessions" from unreasonable invasion by the police. Id at 1648.
64. The decision to issue an arrest warrant implies that there is probable cause to believe that
the suspect committed a crime. Id
65. Id
66. Id at 1650-51.




ception and the availability of telephonic search warrants provide law
enforcers with adequate flexibility.68
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that in light of the partial pro-
tection given third parties by the arrest warrant,69 the government's in-
terest in apprehending felons outweighs the need for a search
warrant.70 Additionally, in rejecting the distinction between a suspect's
residence and a third party's residence, the dissent noted that the ma-
jority opinion failed to specify how long a fugitive must live in a dwell-
ing for it to be considered his "home."' Therefore, the dissent argued
that this distinction without guidelines will serve only to further com-
plicate the police officer's already difficult decision making task.72
By holding that a search warrant is necessary to search a third party's
home, the Supreme Court, in Steagald v. United States,73 effected a
more equal protection of people and objects under the fourth amend-
ment.74 The Court arrived at this conclusion by correctly interpreting
the intent of the framers of the Constitution.75 The Court rightly dis-
tinguished the different interests protected by the two types of war-
rants.76 A third party's privacy interests should not be diminished
solely because a police officer believes a fugitive to be in the third
party's home. An entry into a third party's home pursuant to an arrest
warrant coupled with a reasonable belief that the suspect can be found
there suffers from the same deficiency as the English writs of assistance.
Both fail to provide judicial scrutiny to protect rights of innocent par-
ties not named in the warrant.77
The Steagald majority adequately answered the government's charge
that a search warrant requirement would seriously impede police oper-
68. Id See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2): "If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense
with a written affidavit, a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon sworn oral testi-
mony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means." See also Marek, Telephonic
Search Warrants 4 New Equation/or Exigent Circunstances, 1980 CRim. L. Rav. 45; Miller,
Telephonic Search Warrants: 7he San Diego Experience, 9 PROSECUTOR 385 (1973).
69. The arrest warrant insures that police are on official business and limits the scope of the
search to finding the suspect. Id at 1654-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 1655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. Id at 1655-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. Id at 1657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
74. Id at 1647.
75. See notes 11-15 supra.
76. See note 26 supra.
77. See notes 13-16 supra.
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ations78 This contention was without merit given the options of war-
rantless arrests in the fugitive's home79 or in a public place,80 the
exigent circumstance exception, and telephonic search warrants.81
The dissent, however, raised an important point which the Court will
have to consider in the future: namely, the length of time a fugitive
must live in a dwelling before it is considered his home so that Payton
rather than Steagald will be the controlling law. 2 The Court does not
specify a requisite term of residence or any other guideline to assist
lower courts in distinguishing a resident from a guest.
Like Payton, the Steagald decision also raises new questions. Lower
courts are left to speculate as to the rights of other non-resident persons
present at the time of the search. The Court left unresolved the issues
of whether an arrest warrant subject or a mere visitor can object to the
search without a search warrant of a third-party house.8 3
Nevertheless, the Steagald decision is an important step by the Court
in preserving the fourth amendment's intended function of protecting
the sanctity of every person's home from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
B.A..P.
78. 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1652 (1981).
79. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See notes 20-26 supra.
80. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
81. See note 68 supra.
82. Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1657 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also Comment, supra note 4, at 317 n.134, which asserts:
The attempt to define the third party home illustrates why distinguishing between a sus-
pect's home and a third party's home as a basis for a warrant requirement is a fruitless
exercise. One reason is that the line may be difficult for police officers to draw when, for
example, the suspect lives with a friend with or without maintaining a separate residence.
Another is that it is tenuous to base the suspect's fourth amendment rights on what may
be a distinction without a difference. If a suspect lives with her brother and her brother
is considered a third party, both an arrest and search warrant would be required to arrest
her in the residence. However, if the brother is not considered a third party because the
suspect lives at the residence that they share, only an arrest warrant and reasonable be-
lief would be required under Payton.
Id
83. See note 16 supra. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), which restricted standing to
assert fourth amendment violations, will influence the Court in answering these questions.
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